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Figure 1: Institutional Structure for Bank Governance in Sri Lanka 
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Scandals from an Island: Testing Anglo-American Corporate Governance 
Frameworks 
 
Abstract 
Pu pose: this paper provides an account of banking scandals in relation to corporate 
governance failures in an emerging economy, arguing that Anglo-American ideas of 
corporate governance are misplaced in traditional settings.  
Research Methods: semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders. 
Observations of annual general meetings and the personal working experience of one of the 
researchers, along with documentation, provided triangulating data on corporate governance 
practices.  
Findings: We have found that both of the banks studied had adopted Corporate Governance 
CG practices contrary to the expectations of the Sri Lankan CG codes. Key features of CG 
practices that emerged from our investigations of these two scandals are ineffectual central 
bank regulations, familial boards of directors, ceremonial board meetings, biased auditing 
practices, and manipulative Annual General Meetings (AGMs), relying on traditional 
structures of accountability centred around families, kin and social networks.  
Research Implications: we argue, drawing on Weber (1958, 1961, 1968, 1978), that the 
traditionalist culture mediates the process of rationality in bank governance codes and 
regulatory frameworks. Therefore, practices fall far short of expectations.  
Originality: the paper builds on the extended critique of shareholder-centric CG models and 
their transferability to alien contexts. It contributes to the CG studies calling for more 
appreciation of the need to move beyond the conventional view of CG problems as simply 
down to conflicts of interests. We complement and advance the decoupling debate in CG 
studies drawing on the Weberian notion of traditionalism.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, emerging economies, globalization, decoupling, Max 
Weber, traditionalism, Bank 
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2 
Introduction 
The governance of banks has received attention from wider stakeholders as a result of high-
profile bank failures in many countries over the last two decades (de Graaf, 2016; Williams, 
2014). Banking failures, in traditional settings
1
 in particular, are often attributed to a lack of 
regulatory and market controls, and institutional shortcomings leading to fraudulent activities 
(OECD, 2009; Arun and Turner, 2004). Corporate governance (CG) reforms underpinned by 
the Anglo-American corporate governance models
2
 are seen as a panacea to the governance 
problems in both Western and traditional settings (McSweeney, 2008). Sri Lanka – the focus 
of our study – is no exception.  
Banking failures are not new in any context and the recent banking crises are not isolated 
incidents (Grove et al., 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Preceding the recent banking debacle were 
the loan debacle and the junk bond saga in the USA only a decade before the Ernon scandal. 
Then there was the collapse of BCCI in the 1990s in the UK (Marnet, 2007). These scandals, 
predictably, led to heated policy and academic debates concerning the fundamentals of CG 
frameworks, especially for banks in the UK and USA (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2014; Mehran et al., 2011). For instance, McSweeney (2008) argues that the 
shareholder-value model is often a recipe for economic and social disintegration in both 
developed and developing economy settings. Despite these scandals, Anglo-American, 
shareholder-centric CG models continue to dominate multilateral agencies’ agendas (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008). Examining two infamous banking scandals in Sri Lanka (2000-08), 
this paper questions these agendas and builds on the extended critique of shareholder-centric 
CG models and their transferability to alien contexts (John et al., 2016; McSweeney, 2008). 
Most of the critical studies on CG are quantitative and rely on agency theory and neo-
classical economic assumptions (Young et al., 2008). Studies suggest the importance of 
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3 
moving beyond the conventional debate that sees CG problems as being due to conflicts of 
interests, as posited by agency theory (Aguilera and Crespí-Cladera, 2012, 2016). Some 
studies have moved the debate forward by focusing on the diversity of institutional settings 
that has led to variations in CG practices (Aguilera et al., 2008). These studies tend not to 
provide particularly nuanced accounts of variations in CG practices (Yonekura et al., 2012). 
Consequently, the fundamental question/tension over why certain CG mechanisms produce 
unintended consequences in certain institutional settings remains unsatisfactorily addressed. 
To deal with this, we intend to study the vicious cycle of ‘scandal and reform’ through direct 
engagement with the institutional context and key actors. Drawing on Weberian notions of 
traditionalisms and rationalities, the paper takes the theoretical position that using rationalist 
CG measures to address CG scandals in traditional settings is likely to produce undesired 
consequences.  
The Sri Lankan situation is particularly useful for developing our understanding of 
unintended consequences of ‘rational’ Anglo-American CG models. First, despite the CG 
reforms, a series of banking scandals has come to light in Sri Lanka since early 2000. Though 
the story of scandals is not unique, it provides an excellent opportunity to study intensively 
how and why the reforms have produced unanticipated outcomes. Secondly, Sri Lanka has a 
fragile democratic system, led by families, and with weak democratic and financial 
institutions, and is subject to frequent violent political confrontations and ethnic conflicts 
(Stokke and Uyangoda, 2011). Clearly, the fundamental basis for ‘rational’ governance 
models is missing in Sri Lanka.  
The paper begins with a brief literature review, followed by a section on Weberian notions of 
‘rationality’ and ‘traditionalism’. Research methods are then discussed, followed by 
presentations of historical and structural conditions and rational frameworks of CG 
regulations in Sri Lanka. Case study findings and discussions are presented to illustrate the 
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4 
scandals and CG mechanisms, providing explanations for non-compliance and tensions 
between rational and traditional cultures. The last section provides some concluding remarks. 
Corporate Governance, Institutional Settings and Decoupling (Rational vs Traditional) 
Previous studies on CG in the UK and USA have identified a number of institutions that are 
essential for the governing of corporations, including well-developed capital markets, 
professional bodies, democratic institutions and an independent justice system (McNulty et 
al., 2013). Many researchers have argued that institutions such as professional bodies, stock 
exchanges and other associated institutions work relatively independently in order to create a 
workable, shareholder-centric CG framework (Greenspan, 1998). Some studies have 
highlighted the importance of pre-conditions, such as ethics, moral conditions and 
institutional development, for the establishment of good governance (Rocha et al., 2011; 
Moore, 2012). Key questions include how independent these institutions are, how well capital 
markets are developed, and to what extent the legal and ethical systems operate, in non-
Western societies dominated by families, such as Sri Lanka (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008; 
McGee, 2009). Studies of CG in traditional societies/emerging economies are scarce (Rama, 
2012), and CG in the banking sector, especially in traditional settings, is under-researched 
and under-theorised.  
However, some reviews have shed some light on banking governance in traditional settings. 
Arun and Turner (2004) and Arun and Reaz (2006) have explored how bank owners holding 
large shares have misused banks’ funds to control institutions. Nam (2004) argues that 
ownership patterns in traditional settings have led to major bank failures, resulting from tax 
regulation, weak bankruptcy codes, and poor CG rules and regulations. Studies of bank 
governance in Sri Lanka have revealed similar stories (Ekanayake et al., 2009; Senaratne and 
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5 
Gunaratne, 2007). Such incidents were evident during the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s and the recent crisis in 2008 (Williams, 2014).  
In the context of the CG reforms following the financial crisis, debate on the role of different 
institutional contexts in explaining the crisis (Riaz, 2009) and the multiplicity of CG 
challenges is intensifying (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2016). Institutional theory has 
informed this debate, holding that CG practices are embedded within their institutional 
contexts. It is argued that organisational processes shaped by institutions often tend to 
reinforce continuity and reward conformity (Yonekura et al., 2012; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). For example, Yonekura et al. (2012) demonstrate how 
global hegemonic pressure to adopt the Anglo-American CG model has led to a complex 
process of change in the Japanese context. The socio-economic and cultural aspects include 
local companies historically embedded with a duty-to-stakeholders (especially employees) 
approach and a life-long employment commitment reflecting an ‘ethical tradition of 
dutifulness’ and an ‘ethical vocabulary of responsibility, guilt and shame’ derived from 
Mencian and Sung Confucianism. In contrast, Anglo-American values legitimising 
(narrowly) self-interested owners and managers, with an emphasis on shareholder rights, 
constituted a challenge for the companies. Indeed, the required shift in company values and 
objectives, from ‘achieving long-term sustainable growth’ to ‘shareholder wealth 
maximization’, created tension. Accordingly, Japan could not implement the Anglo- 
American model in exactly the same forms as in the US and elsewhere.  
A number of institutional CG studies have focused on the complex institutional contexts and 
rationalities within which a decoupling of imposed CG mechanisms takes place (Yoshikawa 
et al., 2007; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Explicating the antecedents 
and the process of decoupling from the Anglo-Saxon model, Yoshikawa et al. (2007, p.3) 
argue, “On encountering external pressure for change, organisations may import foreign 
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6 
models but decouple them from their original institutional context and modify them to fit 
their own institutional contexts”. Institutional decoupling is an interesting theoretical 
construct in its own right (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Nevertheless, we believe it prone to 
sidelining/camouflaging a more nuanced explanatory account of why, in one context, certain 
mechanisms become decoupled, while in other contexts they do not. Nevertheless, 
institutional studies have offered explanations for decoupling in organisations including 
oranization’s strategic response, sustainability, gaining legitimacy and maintaining power 
(Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Recent institutional theories have advanced the debate drawing 
on institutional logics and the role of actors (Thorton et al., 2012; Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Lounsbury, M. and Boxenbaum, E. 2013). Granting due credit to recent institutional 
literature, Weber’s thought can also advance this debate by focusing on the notion of 
traditionalism. We argue that the adoption of Weberian sociology will allow us to address 
kinship, power of family or clan, and traditional values inherent in the traditional settings, 
which, arguably, remain neglected in existing institutional accounts of decoupling (Yonekura 
et al., 2012; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Our theoretical position is developed further in the 
following section.  
Weber’s Notions of ‘Traditionalism’ and ‘Rationality’ 
Weber’s early work (1961, 1958) indicates that three layers of analysis are required to 
explain social/organisational practices: the nature of the institutional and structural conditions 
(external layer), the historical context (external layer) and the organisational context (internal 
layer). He identifies a number of institutional and structural conditions in a society, which 
facilitate rational calculations, such as profitability, appropriation of all physical means of 
production, freedom of the market, free labour, rational technology, calculable law and 
commercialisation of economic law. To Weber, these are ideal types, which are important in 
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7 
shaping capitalistic regimes. Weber sees ideal-typical capitalism as having been only partially 
realised in the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the West. 
At the second level, Weber focuses on historical details to identify specific features of society 
that facilitate or obstruct the full development of rational capitalism, the modern enterprise 
and rational capital accounting. Weber recognises the role of competing ideas, conflict and 
institutions in influencing capitalism, enterprises and accounting practices. He recognises that 
they are prevalent in the Western context, whilst also recognising that traditional forms of 
capitalism exist throughout the world even now, and were evident in Europe even in the 
eighteenth century.  
Traditionalism seems to stand in the way of the ideal development of markets, and makes 
rational capitalism difficult to develop. Weber’s (1923) work advances these arguments, 
focusing on traditional communities in Indian villages (McLane, 1993). He argues that the 
promotion of an inter-community division of labour was at the heart of traditionalism, while 
the intra-community division of labour was thwarted. This prevented the money economy 
and the capitalism we see in the Western world from flourishing. In contrast, traditional 
social relations in early European societies were broken mainly due to the emergence of the 
intra-community division of labour. This further contributed to the rise of occupational 
communities, leading to the money economy and the development of rational capitalism. In 
traditional societies, occupational groups failed to develop for a variety of reasons, including 
the caste systems in India and Sri Lanka, and tribal relations in African countries.  
Rationalities take a different, substantive form in social settings dominated by traditions 
(such as the Sri Lankan social setting), based on the need to preserve the interests of family 
and clan. According to Weber: 
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8 
The person exercising authority is not a “superior”, but a personal “chief”. His 
administrative staff does not consist primarily of officials, but of personal 
retainers. Those subject to authority are not “members” of an association, but are 
either his traditional “comrades” or his “subjects”. What determines the 
relations of the administrative staff to the chief is not the impersonal obligations 
of office, but personal loyalty to the chief. Obedience is not owed to enacted rules, 
but to the person who occupies a position of authority ... who has been chosen for 
such a position (Weber, 1947, p.341). 
At the third level, Weber (1958, 1961, 1968) argues for separate organisational-level analyses 
that are nonetheless interactive, with external layers of analysis used to investigate 
organisational practices such as CG practices. The external layers (institutional and structural 
conditions as well as historical context) provide the basis for situating a specific case or 
enterprise within a shorter time span, for further analysis of its organisational practices. 
Given the traditionalism that prevails in the external layers in traditional settings such as Sri 
Lanka, family owners (main shareholders) are likely to resist rational/formal regulations that 
do not serve the family’s interests. Legalistic models, based on rational ideas, may well be 
confined to books and documents.  
Drawing on Weber’s (1978) characterisation of rational and traditional societies, Dyball et al. 
(2006, p.53) highlight further differences between the two, arguing, in Weberian terms, that 
the institutions of community, market and state are conjoined in traditional societies. Several 
key elements of traditionalism appear to constitute traditional societies, including personal 
loyalty, obedience, obligations to a personal chief, being subject to a superior, and obedience 
to personal rather than formal authority. We examine whether these elements enable us to 
explain the unintended consequences of rationalistic CG reforms in Sri Lankan banks. 
The Westernised model of governance imposed by policy makers on stock-exchange-listed 
companies may be perceived as a condition of a ‘rational’ society that makes stable economic 
calculations. A society dominated by tradition (like that in Sri Lanka) is more likely to 
produce a very low level of rational calculation and give rise to a different substantive 
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9 
rationality for compliance, such as controls that serve dominant owners. The banking 
scandals in Sri Lanka are perhaps not entirely unexpected given the mismatch between 
rationalistic regulations and traditionalist attitudes toward business. Thus, we believe that 
Weber’s notions of rationality and traditionalism have much to offer CG studies.  
Without denying the benefits of the other theoretical lenses applied in CG studies 
(institutional theories), we would argue that Weber’s work on traditionalism is particularly 
pertinent to understanding corporate scandals and reforms in societies dominated by 
traditions and enables us to extend the decoupling debate in corporate governance 
(Yoshikawa et al., 2007).  First, the development of rational capitalism in Sri Lanka has been 
thwarted by various historical and cultural conditions, including (not only British) colonial 
interventions, caste and ethnicity, and families (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008; 
Hopper et al., 2009; van Helden and Uddin, 2016). The focus on Weberian thought on 
historicity and cultural conditioning complements and advances institutional accounts of 
decoupling as posited in previous studies (Yonekura et al., 2012; Uddin and Choudhury, 
2008).  
Second, elements of traditionalism such as family dominations are deeply rooted in Sri 
Lankan society, and extend to the social, political and cultural lives of the Sri Lankan people. 
Family-led political parties have controlled state power since independence. Many 
businesses, including stock-exchange-listed financial institutions, are in the hands of families 
(Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). Invoking the concept of traditions centred around families 
further elaborates the decoupling of corporate governance practices especially in traditional 
societies. Finally, few studies have made use of Weber’s thoughts on traditional society 
(Dyball et al., 2006). This study refers to calls made by Uddin and Choudhury (2008) for 
further studies of governance failures applying the Weberian lenses of traditional domination, 
family and clan.  
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10 
Research Methods 
In line with the Weberian framework, this research seeks to explain how the external layers 
(structural and historical conditions) interfere with and shape the organisational practices 
(internal layer), and more specifically accounting and governance practices. A critical review 
of the political and social literature is important to an understanding of the influence of the 
external lay rs. Consequently, previous studies of socio-political and socio-economic 
histories, and articles published in national and international newspapers, were reviewed. In 
addition, we used a triangulated research approach, combining interviews, documentary 
evidence and participant observations. 
The paper draws extensively from two banking scandals - PSD
3
 and Seylan
4
 - widely 
reported in local and international newspapers. The second author made two visits to Sri 
Lanka. During the first visit he collected and analysed relevant documents from organisations 
such as the Colombo Stock Exchange and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. He also set up 
appointments for key interviews in the second stage and conducted six preliminary interviews 
with key actors in the banking sector. In the follow-up visit to Sri Lanka, he conducted 21 
more interviews. We had full access to key interviewees. Interviewees were free to talk given 
the full anonymity of respondents. 
The interviewees, over the two stages, included four Securities Exchange Commission  (SEC) 
officials, three stock exchange officials, two assistant governors of the central bank, two 
members of the Fitch Ratings Company, two directors from a professional accountancy body 
(the Sri Lanka Institute of Chartered Accountants, ICASL), two senior academics specialized 
in banking and finance research and four minority shareholders. To gather information and 
insights regarding internal organisational practices, we also interviewed some managers. 
These were six senior managers from the two banks, including two former managers who had 
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11 
worked for the banks during the scandal, and a former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the 
Ceylinco Group (of companies in Sri Lanka). Each interview lasted between thirty minutes 
and two hours and notes were taken throughout. We explored a range of issues, including 
scandals and CG reforms in Sri Lanka, actual practice and regulatory frameworks, the 
influence of families on CG practice, and central bank reports on scandals. 
In addition to the interviews, we reviewed 23 relevant documents, including the central 
bank’s report, Financial Sector Reforms Committee reports, stock exchange documents, 
banks’ annual reports, publications by Seylan Bank’s new management (after the scandal) 
and newspaper reports on CG issues published in Sri Lanka (see Appendix 1). This 
documentary evidence gave us unique insights into the reasons for high-profile CG failures 
on the island. The findings from newspaper reports were also cross-referenced with various 
communities. For instance, we presented our evidence to both academic and professional 
groups to eliminate misinterpretations and improve our explanations.  
Historical and Structural Conditions in Sri Lanka 
Like many other South Asian nations, Sri Lanka has traditional settlements with extended 
families and kinship relations (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2007). The predominant 
socio-economic unit is a household with an extended family. The family unit promotes social 
unity and individual esteem, and social status is derived largely from caste identity and 
family-owned capital rather than individual achievements. The development of Sri Lankan 
capitalism has been driven mainly by its colonial history and the hegemonic politics of elite 
families (Uyangoda, 2000; Jayawardena, 2002). 
Master-servant relationships established through the wealth and status accumulated during 
the colonial period have led to a few elite families dominating national politics in Sri Lanka 
(Roberts, 1979; Jayawardena, 1987). Illangakoon, Bandaranaike and Obeysekara (traditional 
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bourgeois) and Jayawardena, Senanayake and Jayawickrama (colonial bourgeois) are a few 
of the notable elite families on the national political scene (Jayasundara-Smits, 2013). The 
Senanayake and Bandaranaike families have held the reins of power and leadership of the 
main political parties (UNP and SLFP) for most of the post-independence period. These elite 
families have dispensed employment and fringe benefits to estate workers, undertaken 
construction projects to provide infrastructural facilities such as schools, hospitals and 
temples, made donations to charities and villages, and offered protection to village elites 
(Jayantha, 1992, p.199). 
The historical trend of hegemonic family politics is similarly reflected in modern Sri Lankan 
polity and party politics. Both opposition and ruling political parties are still dominated by 
families. For instance, the leader of the previous government (2005-2015) appointed his 
brothers to run important ministries and gave other political positions to relatives, regardless 
of their merit (Sharma, 2009). Family politics at the state level supersede the legal and 
rational institutions, such as state ministries, with loyal supporters and relatives rewarded 
with various positions within public and privately owned enterprises (Hettige, 2008). 
The elite families that dominate Sri Lankan politics also have business connections.
5
 This is 
quite evident from the reflections of the central bank (2008), as a significant number of 
banking and finance companies are run as non-listed, family-owned companies, while many 
large stock-exchange-listed companies are controlled by closely connected families 
(Manawaduge et al., 2009). Thus, family owners and directors often exert direct and indirect 
influences on firm governance and financial performance in these firms and are increasingly 
being reported for diverting firm resources to individual or family use (Wellalage et al., 2012; 
Saliya and Jayasinghe, 2016). On the other hand, wealthy business owners and English-
speaking professionals from the upper middle class of Sri Lankan society (so-called ‘elites’) 
maintain cartels using ‘social networks’, such as old boys’ associations, Rotary Clubs and 
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Lions Clubs. These cartels operate as a powerful source of organisational links. For example, 
when companies recruit new employees, applications come through members of these cartels, 
who are often powerful shareholders and senior managers in the organisations. 
Previous studies have also demonstrated that family links and social networks influence the 
outcome of loan applications to finance and bank companies (Khan and Uddin, 2005, 2006; 
Saliya and Jayasinghe, 2016). In addition, career promotions are based on loyalty shown to 
powerful family management, rather than on rational elements such as skills, expertise or 
professional judgment. Overall, this familial hegemony in the state and the economy 
obstructs the ‘ideal’ functioning of the state and state-like bodies. Bank governance processes 
in Sri Lanka are unlikely to escape the influence of familial institutions, which are further 
detailed below. 
Bank Governance Codes and Scandals 
The Colombo Stock Exchange currently lists 33 banks, including multinational, publicly 
owned and state-owned banks. State-owned (majority share) companies listed on the stock 
exchange dominate the banking sector in terms of commercial assets. This paper draws 
mainly on information concerning two Sri Lankan banks – PSD Bank and Seylan Bank – 
which have been involved in some much-talked-about scandals in Sri Lanka in recent years.  
In Sri Lanka, CG regulations for banks currently stem mainly from four institutions: the 
central bank, ICASL, the SEC, and the Registrar of Companies, which is a government office 
(Figure 1). These institutions are formally accountable to the Ministry of Finance, which is 
particularly involved in decisions such as the granting or revoking of bank licences. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
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The central bank operates as the Sri Lankan government’s watchdog for the banking sector. 
The SEC functions as the government-appointed regulator, establishing rules of best practice 
for listed companies, including banks, and monitoring the work of the stock exchange and its 
operations. ICASL, a professional accountancy body, partially financed by the government, 
provides auditing services and ensures that both listed and non-listed companies conform to 
accounting and auditing standards. On the other hand, the Colombo Stock Exchange and 
Fitch Ratings Company operate as private companies facilitating the capital markets.  
The CG reforms in Sri Lanka began in 1997 with a voluntary code of practice – a replica of 
the UK code. Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development 
(OECD) issued some guidance on CG reforms in South Asian countries, in particular for 
listed companies. Following the OECD recommendations (OECD, 1999) and the Hampel 
Code/Combined Code 1998, Sri Lanka, being advised by donor agencies, further tightened 
and revamped the code in 2003 (ICASL, 2003). The 2003 code, based on the comply or 
explain approach, covered all aspects of CG and incorporated many financial and non-
financial aspects.  
In addition to the above code, both listed and non-listed banks are required to conform to the 
Banking Act 2007 issued by the central bank. This banking act is very detailed and 
prescriptive. Under the 2007 framework, the central bank now has the power to examine all 
commercial banks on-site at least once in a two-year cycle. In a separate development, in 
2008, the Colombo Stock Exchange incorporated CG rules into its listing rules and made 
them mandatory for listed companies, including banks. Taking all of the developments into 
consideration, we have identified two key themes of these reforms.  
The first theme is the adoption of stronger regulatory mechanisms making banks accountable 
to the central bank. The second is the adoption of various CG mechanisms ensuring banks’ 
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15 
accountability to their shareholders/investors. The CG mechanisms include the accountability 
of the board of directors, transparent accounting and auditing practices, and working annual 
general meetings (AGMs). Nevertheless, the question is whether the reforms and new 
directions have been effective in ensuring banking governance in the context of traditional 
settlements and familial hegemony. This paper draws on two high-profile banking scandals to 
better describe the reforms and illustrate the impotency of rationalistic/legalistic governance 
models in the context of traditionalism in Sri Lanka. These scandals are briefly described 
below. 
PSD Bank 
PSD started its operations in 1997. After just five years, the central bank decided to cancel its 
banking license, leaving the hard-earned savings of 15,000 depositors in limbo. The main 
reason given by the central bank was PSD’s high percentage of slow-moving debt and non-
performing loans. Central bank investigation officers concluded that the bank had suffered a 
revenue loss of 419.7 million Rupees
6
, pushing it into a negative net-worth position. It was 
also revealed that PSD’s non-performing advances accounted for 1.27 billion Rupees. There 
were allegations that the bank had made gratification payments to public officials to bring in 
business (Daily News, 2002).
7
 Then it was found that the chairman, managing director and 
two other directors had withdrawn money from the bank soon after the suspension order was 
served. Further mismanagement claims were made against the chairman of the bank, 
including exchanging land for bank shares without infusing any real cash  and breaking the 
single borrower limit at a time of cash crisis. 
It was widely reported that PSD had flouted the central bank’s rules on granting loans to 
clients, reporting and auditing (Sunday Leader, 2002; Abeysinghe, 2015). As the central 
bank’s report revealed, in some instances, the recommendations of the credit-granting section 
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even contained false accounts and statements (Central Bank, 1999). Much worse, loans had 
allegedly been granted to some of the managers’ cronies without any contractual agreements. 
Questions were raised about why the central bank and the auditors had failed to detect these 
serious frauds sooner. We will discuss this further below, but first we outline the Seylan Bank 
scandal. 
Seylan Bank 
Seylan was licensed as a publicly owned commercial bank and began operations in 1988. The 
controlling shareholder of Seylan was a major Sri Lankan conglomerate operating across a 
range of industries and consisting of more than 250 affiliated companies and over 30,000 
employees, named the ‘Ceylinco Consolidated Group of Companies’. Seylan received 
investments from several other Ceylinco subsidiary companies. For instance, 24 per cent of 
Seylan shares were owned by a Ceylinco finance company until the end of 2008. At the same 
time, Seylan had in turn invested in fellow Ceylinco subsidiaries. Seylan’s board of directors 
comprised Ceylinco’s chairman, his spouse, and fellow directors of other subsidiaries of 
Ceylinco.  
Nevertheless, Seylan was known as one of most successful listed public companies in Sri 
Lanka until 2005. The crisis came to light when the central bank imposed restrictions on 
Seylan’s aggressive, expansive lending programmes, which far exceeded the amount of 
capital it had available. This poor banking practice was particularly evidenced by its high 
gearing ratio (29 times) compared with industry standards (15 times) (Narangoda, 2010). The 
crisis was further deepened by sudden liquidity problems faced by a subsidiary company of 
Ceylinco, GKCC (Lanka Business, 2008; Daily News, 2011). This led to media stories that 
GKCC’s board of directors was trying to use Seylan Bank deposits to cover up its liquidity 
problems. The Seylan board attempted to reassure its depositors, but to no avail. Panic 
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reactions and premature withdrawals of Seylan deposits by its customers drove Seylan into a 
deeper liquidity crisis. At this point, in order to secure the banking system and reassure public 
confidence and trust, the central bank intervened: Seylan’s board of directors was dissolved 
and its operations brought under the control of a leading state-run bank on 28 December 
2008.  
Drawing on the PSD and Seylan scandals, the annual reports of other financial institutions 
and interviews with key stakeholders, the next sections detail the two key themes of the 
reforms (as identified earlier) and explain why they failed to produce expected outcomes. 
Banks’ Accountability to the Central Bank: Political and Family Feuds 
The political issues seem to begin at the very top level of banking governance – with the 
central bank. For instance, the appointment of the former governor of the central bank (2006-
15) was questioned in the media. It was known that the former governor was a provincial 
councillor of one of the main political parties in Sri Lanka but had later changed his 
allegiance to the political party in power (Colombo Page, 2010); thus, he had joined the 
former Sri Lankan president’s campaign as chief economic adviser and was a major 
contributor to the president’s economic manifesto. Some critics also pointed to the former 
governor’s lack of relevant academic and professional background for the job, particularly in 
the areas of economics and banking (ibid.).
8
 
Political affiliation issues are not unique to the case of the central bank’s governor within Sri 
Lanka’s banking sector. They are also reflected in the two banking scandals studied in this 
paper. It has transpired that the chairman of Seylan’s board appears to have been a large 
donor to the opposition party at the time of Seylan’s collapse. Interviews and newspaper 
reports seem to claim that this may have contributed to his downfall (Bottom Line, 2010). 
This suspicion was further strengthened, as our fieldwork revealed, by the fact that the Seylan 
Page 20 of 45
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpoib
critical perspectives on international business
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
critical perspectives on international business
18 
chairman had been known to be flouting the banking regulations for years, but only came 
under the scrutiny of the central bank in 2005. This coincided with a change in the political 
landscape of Sri Lanka. The Seylan chairman’s political ambitions perhaps did not help his 
position: he was also reported to have misappropriated the bank’s money to fund the main 
opposition party at the time, the UNP (Bottom Line, 2010). Some claim that his decision to 
finance UNP campaigns may have motivated the then-ruling party in Sri Lanka to impose 
sanctions on Seylan. 
Similarly, politics lay behind the establishment of PSD in 1997, when the governor of the 
central bank was overruled by the Sri Lankan president and forced to license PSD’s 
operations (The Sunday Leader, 2002). The central bank’s governor unfortunately appeared 
to stand alone in his reservations regarding the integrity and ethics of the PSD chairman. 
Even the attorney general at the time failed to act on a file holding startling revelations of a 
one-million-US-dollar fraud perpetrated by the PSD owner during his tenure as CFO and 
general manager of Seylan in 1992. In this infamous fraud, he instructed his officers to remit 
one million US dollars to D&A International Import & Export Inc. (US). This company was 
allegedly owned by the PSD chairman, who was accused of having transfered the monies in 
order to qualify for and secure green cards for himself and his family (Sunday Leader, 2002). 
This shows how and when political influence was used in these cases.  
The central bank’s own report on PSD, published in 1999, was very critical. Examining 
officers at the central bank asserted that the owners’ investment in PSD shares might be 
considered a devious means of increasing its share capital to comply with statutory 
requirements (Sunday Leader, 2002). This central bank report was not acted upon for three 
years. Similarly, the regulatory authorities were unable to detect the imprudent practices 
followed by PSD over a period of five years, jeopardising the deposits of 15,000 individuals.  
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Accountability to Shareholders/Investors 
Several key CG reforms
9
 were implemented in Sri Lanka. This brought in an idealised 
Anglo-American CG framework with shareholder supremacy, transparency and 
accountability of board members, perhaps in a bid to separate the ‘household’ from the 
‘company’. Three key expectations are identified: (a) an accountable board structure, (b) 
reliable auditing practices, and (c) a working AGM. As will be discussed below, these 
measures have produced practices contrary to expectations.  
Boards of directors: family affairs  
According to the CG codes and central bank directives, non-executive directors should be 
independent of management and free of any business or other relationships that might 
materially interfere with the exercising of independent judgment. It is also stated that no 
individual or small group of individuals should dominate a board’s decision making.  
However, in common with many other traditional societies (e.g. Bangladesh, as reported by 
Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), the ownership and control structures of Sri Lankan companies 
are characterised by distinctive features, such as the existence of a controlling shareholder 
(Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2007). Most controlling shareholders are individuals or families, 
and in some cases a single family will have controlling shares in a number of companies 
(Caprio et al., 2007). There are also instances in which these controlling shareholders use 
‘control pyramids’ to retain control. To establish these pyramids they use a ‘web of vertical 
and cross-shareholdings’ and have a large number of companies (both regulated and 
unregulated) under their direct or indirect ownership and control (Morck et al., 2005; Young 
et al., 2008). In the case of family-controlled banks, the controlling family’s interests and 
dominance in the boardroom give rise to unique CG challenges, such as related-party lending 
(Uddin et al., in press; Fitch Ratings, 2007; Nam, 2004). 
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The obvious aim of a controlling shareholder is to form a friendly board of directors for the 
company (Carlos and Uddin, 2016; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). This was evident in both 
scandals. First, a senior manager (finance) from Seylan stated the following in one of our 
interviews: The chairman, his wife and their loyal family friends dominated the whole board 
of directors. Each and every financial decision needed personal approval from the chairman. 
Conducting regular and transparent board meetings, with representation by non-executive 
directors, is a necessary condition for the healthy operation of companies. However, our 
fieldwork revealed that board of directors meetings were purely ceremonial and served the 
controlling shareholders. A former official of Seylan, who had access to Seylan board 
meetings as the chairman’s invitee and observer, recalled: The whole board worked for the 
chairman. Everybody on the board was his close ally.  
A similar story is evident in the PSD scandal. The founder/chairman of PSD was the ex-CEO 
of Seylan Bank. Not surprisingly, when PSD’s founder left Seylan he took several of his ex-
colleagues with him to form PSD. All became board members of PSD. This ‘close alliance’ 
within PSD’s board enabled the chairman to enjoy almost unlimited power. For instance, 
none of the board members of PSD raised any objections when its chairman invested 13.9 per 
cent of the bank’s capital funds in another bank (Pan Asia Bank), flouting the central bank 
directives that allow only 10 per cent of capital funds to be placed in the equity of a single 
unquoted company. In another incident, the PSD chairman single-handedly authorised 22.5 
per cent of PSD’s capital funds to be loaned to one company. An assistant governor of the 
central bank told us: PSD Bank did not have a proper policy on its investments. The chairman 
himself made decisions on investments in equity and the board of directors almost 
automatically approved the investments. 
These family and friend-oriented affairs on boards are also common in other companies. Our 
review of company annual reports revealed that the boards of 75 per cent of banking 
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companies listed on the stock exchange were dominated by close family members (CSE, 
2008). In several companies, we found the chairman’s wife to be deputy chairman or a 
director. As can be seen from these examples, board meetings may be organised to adhere to 
the formal regulations, but decisions are still made to preserve the influence of major 
shareholders or family members.  
Auditing: a friendly matter 
Impartial auditing is an integral part of good CG practices. All codes of CG adopted in Sri 
Lanka have included a set of best practices for auditing services. According to the guidelines 
issued by the SEC for the appointment of auditors for listed companies in Sri Lanka, “the 
partner of the audit firm or a member of the engagement team does not benefit financially or 
in another form of interest from the listed company. Also, in listed companies, the 
appointment and reappointment of external auditors must be made with the knowledge of the 
company’s audit committee, well publicised and proposed at an AGM. In particular, Section 
154 of the Company Act of Sri Lanka states that “a Company at an Annual General Meeting 
has to appoint an Auditor to hold office, from the conclusion of that Meeting, until the 
conclusion of the next Annual General Meeting”. However, there is a difference between the 
legal requirements and actual banking practice. In reality, it is the chairman – the head of the 
family – who makes the necessary appointments. AGMs provide the necessary legitimacy for 
the appointments that have already been made. Similar practices were found in both banks 
studied in this paper. These auditing practices are often supplemented by a system of 
dispositions and reciprocal relationships, historically embedded in Sri Lankan society 
(Jayawardena, 1987, 2002). 
It is very common to see senior corporate executives and accountants in the corporate sector 
(including banks) and the auditing professionals in established auditing firms all coming from 
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closely knit elite social groups, formed under the names of old boys’/girls’ associations 
(based on elite schools or highly ranked universities) and professional clubs such as the 
Rotary and Lions clubs (Saliya and Jayasinghe, 2016). Donors and international whistle-
blower organisations have repeatedly questioned auditors’ independence in the Sri Lankan 
corporate sector (ADB, 2002; Edwards, 2009). Interviews with a former top-level official at 
Seylan were quite revealing, though not surprising: By coincidence, that audit firm was 
managed by one of my classmates and a close friend. It made my job easier as we often 
discussed the bank’s audit reports during our informal meetings. 
Bank auditors are required to highlight any issues, such as warning signs of fraud in banking 
operations, typical internal controls, tests of control and substantive audit procedures for two 
of the major operational areas in banking (treasury and trading operations and lending 
activities), and also in the financial ratios commonly used to analyse banks’ financial 
condition and performance. Nevertheless, auditors failed to notice any wrongdoing and gave 
clean bills of health to the banks in question. Their close relationships with the employees 
and controlling shareholders made it difficult for the auditors to raise the issue of serious 
financial crimes. For instance, accounting fraud in PSD – an operating loss of 16.5 million 
Rupees turned into a profit of 8.3 million Rupees in one financial year – went completely 
unnoticed (Sunday Leader, 2002).  
AGM: a staged drama 
An AGM is a ‘rational’ step for ensuring the full participation of all owners, and the 
accountability and transparency of the company. This is further enforced in the codes in Sri 
Lanka, following the Anglo-American tradition of governance. However, AGMs often fail to 
live up to these expectations in Sri Lankan companies, and neither of the banks in question 
was an exception to this.  
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Our fieldwork revealed that the controlling shareholders use a variety of methods, such as 
unreachable locations for meetings and creating language barriers, to stop any real 
engagement by minority shareholders during the AGMs (the Nation, 2014). A minority 
shareholder of a listed company commented: The selection of the place itself is a part of the 
plan to avoid the participation of shareholders at the AGM. There was no proper translator 
and the floor was clueless on what was happening. It is quite clear that proper debate is 
completely missing from AGMs. One frustrated shareholder commented: We were shocked 
by the disregard of the directors, who continually refused to respond to the questions raised 
by the floor. AGMs ha e become a rubber stamp for top management decisions (OECD, 
2010). A minority shareholder of a private bank stated: I used to attend AGMs but I quickly 
realised it was a waste of my time. The meeting is always ‘fixed’. The allies of board 
members dominate its proceedings. General shareholders of both banks – Seylan and PDS – 
had had similar experiences, as our interviews revealed. A former manager at Seylan pointed 
out the ceremonial nature of AGMs: We normally had 100-150 members participating in our 
AGMs – all others sent their proxies. Those who attended did so only to enjoy the food and 
the refreshments. These comments reflect the difficulty of having sensible participation in 
AGMs and of ensuring the transparency and accountability of the company.  
Another reason for this marginalisation of minority shareholders, as an SEC official 
commented, was a lack of, or limited pressure from, other stakeholders, unlike in the 
developed world. We also found that, in Sri Lanka, shareholder and investor association and 
financial press activities are particularly infrequent. There is less ongoing criticism and 
watchdog activity regarding the financial reporting and CG of public and private companies. 
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Discussion 
Following the Weberian methodologies, this paper has examined the historical and cultural 
conditions of Sri Lankan society, showing that the society is heavily influenced by family 
culture. Heredity politics are the backbone of Sri Lankan democracy, and ultimate 
accountability seems to lie with the family. In this way, Sri Lanka exhibits features of 
traditionalism in action. Consequently, extended family members and fictive kin dominate 
the legal and rational institutions (Hettige, 2008). The field of business, including that of 
banks, has not escaped these traditions of family controlling a significant proportion of the 
private and public assets in Sri Lanka (Manawaduge et al., 2009). 
We have found that both of the banks studied had adopted CG practices contrary to the 
expectations of the 1997 and 2003 Sri Lankan CG codes. Key features of CG practices that 
emerged from our investigations of these two scandals are ineffectual central bank 
regulations, familial boards of directors, ceremonial board meetings, biased auditing 
practices, and manipulative AGMs.  
These findings are contrary to the expectations of anglo-american corporate governance 
models (John et al., 2016; McSweeney, 2008). Agency theory centric corporate governance 
studies are perhaps weak in explaining divergent, unintended and dysfunctional consequences 
of CG models in varied settings (Young et al., 2008). Institutional studies, though not many 
in CG field, have attempted to explain the variations in CG practices in diverse institutional 
settings by invoking the concept of decoupling (Aguilera et al., 2008; Yonekura et al., 2012; 
Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Traditionalism offers additional dimensions and deeper insights in 
explaining unintended consequences of intended ‘rational’ CG model such as familial boards 
of directors, ceremonial board meetings, biased auditing practices, and manipulative AGMs 
in traditional societies such as Sri Lanka. As we will see below, key elements of 
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traditionalism, including personal loyalty, the master-servant relationship, and obedience to 
personal rather than formal authority, provide nuanced accounts of decoupled practices and 
explain why banks were able to deploy a particular form of avoidance strategy.  
First, both banks seem to have flouted the central bank’s rules on many occasions, according 
to the central bank’s report. False accounting, granting loans to cronies and lending 
exceeding the limit were the key findings. This central bank report was not acted upon for 
three years. Questions were raised about why the central bank and the auditors had failed to 
detect these serious frauds sooner. The weak institutional settings in Sri Lanka, from the 
perspective of institutional theories, provides some explanations of decoupling (Yoshikawa et 
al., 2007) but this is much clearer if we invoke the notions of personal loyalty/relationship 
and the dominance of family over the state’s institutions. We believe, these traditional 
elements explain why the state institutions are weak in enforcing changes and prevent frauds 
presented above. Dyball et al.’s (2006) findings are similar: they comment that ‘power’ and 
‘influence’ were important elements in banks’ decisions to grant or deny loans. This alludes 
to a ‘traditional’ mode of operations, in which ‘personal’ relationships constitute market and 
state transactions (p.62). We would argue that the families in question took advantage of the 
poor justice system (lack of state resources) and relied on family resources (traditional 
norms) to avoid showing the required accountability to other stakeholders. 
The authorities seem to be selective in combating serious financial irregularities and even 
fraud. This places the monies of depositors at greater risk. There is overwhelming evidence to 
suggest that political considerations were placed above penalising Seylan or PSD. Loyalty or 
disloyalty to families in power received greater attention than infringements of formal central 
bank laws. Selective use of sanctions by state bodies, influenced by the politics of the day, is 
an example of traditionalism encountering and mediating rational enterprise. This is probably 
where Sri Lankan public limited companies are least similar to Anglo-American companies, 
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with severe consequences for wider stakeholders. In keeping with the findings of Uddin and 
Choudhruy (2008) in Bangladesh, we would argue that incompatible modes of action 
(traditional and rational) are at play here. The findings show that the main purpose of having 
formal or tighter central bank regulations has become irrelevant, as they have become the 
perfect weapon for political victories. 
Second, rational measures such as accountable boards clash with the desire to preserve the 
influence of major shareholders or family members. Though regulatory compliance in 
relation to board meetings and processes existed on paper in these banks, they did not serve 
their real purpose (of protecting other shareholders and the public) as intended. These 
symbolic compliance – a sign of decoupling - are similar to institutional CG studies as 
reported earlier. Weberian thought provides further clarity why and how these banks have 
engaged in symbolic compliance strategy. Typical explanations for decoupling such as 
maintaining power or gaining legitimacy perhaps are useful but understanding ‘family’ and 
‘kin’ in traditional settings offer deeper insights. As Weber (1978) argues, it is very common 
for the most important posts to be filled by members of the ruling family or clan in 
traditionalist organisations. Close family members on the board ensure that family ‘secrets’ 
remain safe. This is a ‘rational’ action as far as the family is concerned. The selection of close 
family members also enables family domination within the enterprise to continue (Uddin, 
2009). 
Often, there is no separation between the enterprise and the household, and it is frequently 
difficult to discern larger ‘segments of capital’ divided along coherent, sectoral lines (Dyball 
and Valcarcel, 1999, p.306). Owing to the strong presence of close family members on the 
board, board meetings turn into family meetings. Family meetings are not held publicly and 
information about their outcomes is undisclosed, as the business is seen as a household matter 
and therefore confidential (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). As many of our respondents 
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claimed, legal documentation is often maintained only as a formality. There is no legal 
mechanism for monitoring whether directors have physically held a board meeting. This is 
strikingly similar to the situation in other traditional settings, as previous studies have 
indicated (Uddin, 2009; Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999). Weber (1956, 1978) argues for multiple 
rationalities, including rational and substantive. In the case of a traditional society in which a 
family takes over an enterprise, rationality takes a substantive form as the players act to 
preserve the interests of the family and clan. A friendly board of directors is a perfect 
platform through which to render regulations ineffective. 
Evidently, both banks had flouted the regulations of state institutions for a long time before 
going bust. For instance, the Colombo Stock Exchange, the central bank and the SEC had 
warned Ceylinco’s chairman and his fellow directors about their wrongdoings many times, 
but it seems that neither their warnings nor legal pressures were strong enough to influence 
the politically powerful Ceylinco and Seylan chairman and protect the group’s minority 
shareholders. According to Weber (1978), family and clans take precedence over legal 
authority. State institutions are overwhelmed by the family’s influence in many traditional 
settings (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008), and Sri Lanka is no exception. 
Third, we have found, on paper, that the codes of CG adopted in Sri Lanka do include a set of 
best practices for auditing services. In the context of under-developed capital markets, and 
weak financial regulatory institutions, the role of an independent auditor is vital in ensuring 
transparency. Institutional studies also reported divergent auditing services in different 
settings (Yonekera et al., 2012). Organisational legitimacy, power or sustainability are often 
offered as the rationales for decoupled practices. Weberian notion of traditionalism enables 
us to ask more fundamental questions such as what is it to be “independent” in traditional 
settings. Thus, the notion of ‘independence’ perhaps needs further unpacking to fully 
understand auditing services especially in traditional settings. It is argued, “this notion of an 
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‘independent’ auditor is based on the assumption, developed in modern states, that an audit is 
a product of rational calculation” (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008, p.1042). However, our 
findings suggest that auditors who gained membership of localised cartels became victims of 
reciprocal relations. As Weber (1978) points out, traditionalism mediates the process of 
rational behaviour, so the question remains whether auditors can maintain independence in 
Western terms. The idea of independence does not seem to have any relevance in the context 
of the cosy relationship between auditor and the management of banking companies. Reaz 
and Arun’s (2006) work on audits in Bangladeshi banks draws a similar conclusion, as they 
maintain, ‘Banks are very lucrative clients, and in most cases, the audit firms are also linked 
with the personal businesses of the bank owners. As a result, the auditors tend to give in to 
the demands of the banks’ owners and prepare audit reports in the way the banks want them 
to’ (p.101). They further point out that banks have been accused of window dressing to hide 
underlying problems, weaknesses and irregularities. There are many examples of banks 
revealing different figures under the same heading in different disclosures (p.101). 
To Weber, it would not be surprising for family-controlled companies to inhibit 
accountability and transparency because it concerns the revelation of family secrets (Dyball 
and Valcarcel, 1999). Researchers argue that unwillingness to reveal financial information 
may well be due to a tax-avoidance culture, brought about by weak regulatory frameworks 
and enforcement (Perera, 1989). We would argue that traditionalism is at work here in 
weakening the regulatory framework. 
Fourth, AGMs often fail to live up to expectations in Sri Lankan companies. Neither bank 
investigated here was an exception. Rational measures aimed at making directors/families 
accountable to general or minority shareholders via AGMs remain ineffective. According to 
Weber (1978), traditional attitudes mediate the rational process and consequently hinder the 
rational development of accountability. As evidenced above, various institutions in Sri Lanka, 
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drawing on legal authority, have attempted to influence the current state of AGMs and 
accountability to general shareholders. These measures remain inadequate, however, in the 
context of the overwhelming involvement of powerful families. 
In summary, the family tradition in business and politics continues to thrive, despite 
continuous bombardment from strict measures and reforms. Overall, the reconciliation of the 
modern CG framework with traditional, family-run businesses remains unachieved. This also 
raises concerns about the effectiveness of mirror-image Western institutions for influencing 
the accountability and transparency of stock-exchange-listed companies in a traditional 
setting. 
Conclusion 
This paper concludes by considering the research questions set out earlier. Why do the 
Anglo-American CG models produce unintended consequences in traditional societies? This 
paper has drawn on the Weberian notion of ‘traditionalism’ to provide deeper explanations of 
the unintended consequences and raise the question of the transferability of knowledge from 
one context (Western) to the other (traditional). 
The study has examined two banking scandals, institutional settings, and historical and 
political contexts, drawing on interviews, literature and various pieces of documentation. The 
findings indicate that CG measures, including the central bank’s interventions, are inadequate 
in the traditional cultural and political context of Sri Lanka. Rather than adopting generally 
accepted rational governance codes and directives, Sri Lankan publicly owned banks tend to 
adopt familial boards of directors, conduct ceremonial board meetings, engage in biased 
auditing practices, and hold manipulative AGMs.  
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Theoretically, we have argued that the emergence of familial board practices, ritual 
compliance and manipulative AGMs and auditing practices provides new insights if examined 
in the context of traditionalism. We have made a strong case to advance the debate on 
institutional decoupling in explaining corporate governance models and their unintended 
consequences such as banking scandals, especially in traditional settings. We have discussed 
historical and political conditions in Sri Lanka as a means to understanding the development 
of Sri Lankan society and the dominance of families in economic and political affairs. We 
have demonstrated how elements of traditional societies, including personal loyalty and 
obedience to personal rather than formal authority, provide an understanding of banks’ 
unexpected CG practices and an insight why decoupling occurs in traditional settings. 
Viewed through a Weberian lens, it is understandable that companies devote significant effort 
to satisfying individuals rather than the state’s legal institutions. It enables us to understand 
how the institutions operate in the context of the underlying conditions of traditional societies 
which have encouraged banking companies to avoid rationalistic measures. Family and chief 
(head of the family), kin, fictive kin and relatives are the essential fabric of traditional 
society. Thus, it is unsurprising to see CG mechanisms overwhelmed by individuals or 
families. Traditionalism drives a subject to be loyal to the chief in order to be seen as 
trustworthy (Weber, 1947). These elements of traditionalism become more apparent when we 
examine the avoidance strategies adopted by the two banks under study here. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, the paper also builds on the extended critique 
of shareholder-centric CG models and their transferability to alien contexts (John et al., 2016; 
McSweeney, 2008). Intensive case studies of the vicious cycle of ‘scandal and reform’ 
provided us with an opportunity to contribute to this critique. Our findings raise concerns 
about the expectations of the Anglo-American model in traditional settings. There is an 
underlying assumption, in the adopted 2003 code that mirrors the UK’s CG code, that 
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institutions and societies are always homogeneous. The fundamental understanding of policy 
makers is that a CG model is just a set of techniques. Therefore, the main issue for them is 
how these techniques should be transferred or developed to create market and organisational 
efficiency and, in turn, economic development. This is highly unrealistic and ambitious. For 
example, Anglo-American CG models ignore the effects of family ownership on 
accountability and transparency, assuming professionalised management and a degree of 
separation of ownership and control. Perfectly competitive markets are unlikely to occur in 
developing countries with fragile judicial systems and weak enforcement in the capital 
markets. More often, pri ate ownership is concentrated in families, which have informal links 
to vital external actors and institutions in the social, political and commercial domains. Thus, 
there is a strong need to accommodate these complex factors in a broader CG model.  
Second, it contributes to the CG studies calling for more appreciation of the need to move 
beyond the conventional view of CG problems as simply down to conflicts of interests 
(Aguilera and Crespí-Cladera, 2012, 2016). Institutional theory has informed this debate, 
holding that CG practices are embedded within their institutional contexts (Yonekura et al., 
2012). We complement and advance the decoupling debate in CG studies drawing on the 
notion of Traditionalism. The institutional decoupling provides an understanding of divergent 
CG practices focusing on institutional differences. Weberian thought takes us further to 
understand how the CG institutions operate in the context of the underlying conditions of 
traditional societies which have encouraged banking companies to avoid rationalistic 
measures. We also acknowledge that the idea of decoupling has been further dvanced by 
recent institutional literature. Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated earlier, elements of 
traditionalism can provide deeper insights into decoupled corporate governance practices. 
Key elements of traditionalism, including personal loyalty, the master-servant relationship, 
and obedience to personal rather than formal authority provide further explanations of 
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unexpected and unintended corporate governance practices in traditional societies such as Sri 
Lanka. We have also moved this debate forward, locating CG problems within the broader 
historical and structural conditions, drawing on the Weberian thought.     
Finally, this paper has opened the way for further research on the transferability of business 
knowledge, be it related to CG or business models. We would encourage policy makers to 
explore suitable CG models for these traditional economies. Rather than considering local 
contexts as unproblematic and passive, future policy drives should open a new agenda for 
studying CG issues meaningfully, considering local contexts as problematic and dynamic.  
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1
 Weber (1978) defines traditional settings as those in which traditional values such as personal 
loyalty, family and kinship supersede a rational and legalistic model of society and economy.  
2
 These models are shareholder-centric, relying on strong capital markets and other democratic 
institutions. 
3
 PSD was closed down. 
4
 On 28 December 2008, Seylan’s board of directors was dissolved and its operations brought 
under the control of a leading state-run bank. The critiques and reflections made in this paper do 
not refer to or represent Seylan’s post-2008 performance in any way. 
5
 For example, the owner of the Ceylinco Group was a nephew of J.R. Jayawardene, a leading 
politician and later Prime Minister and First Executive President of Sri Lanka.  
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6
 £1 = 213 Rupees (07.02.2014). 
7
 The heads of 33 government departments had been paid gratifications valued at over 40.5 
million Rupees, as incentive ‘Gold Certificates’, out of over 70.2 billion Rupees of state funds 
deposited in the PSD Bank between 1997 and 2002. 
8
 Prior to becoming governor he had worked only as a management consultant and was a 
chartered accountant by training. 
9
 In 2003, a CG code, similar to the UK Combined Code of CG, had been adopted on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis. 
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